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 In the increasingly globalized world economies, a variety of drivers define the market and regulatory contexts for 
commercializing the strategic innovations that provide significant competitive advantage in the near-term and long-term 
future.  In this study we examine how technological roadmapping integrates these strategic contextual factors with the 
organizational capabilities and resources of the firm to commercialize strategic innovations.  This is done by first examining 
four roadmapping case-studies: (1) at Motorola, (2) at Sandia National laboratories, (3) the National and International 
Roadmaps for Semiconductors, and (3) nanotechnologies.  A five stage process is proposed for commercializing strategic 
innovations.  Finally, managerial implications and potential future research are discussed. 
 




 In the past few years, the landscape for market 
competition has changed rapidly and radically.  Markets 
have become globally connected in the “flat world” 
(Friedman, 2005).  Enterprises In the hyper-competitive 
global markets must therefore strive to launch their 
strategic innovations, and strive harder to make their 
innovations emerge as the dominant designs and technology 
standards in their industries (Gehani, 1998).   
 In this study we examine the contexts under which 
firms commercialize their strategic innovations.  These 
strategic innovations are defined as those innovations which 
(a) take into consideration the competitive, regulatory and 
environmental uncertainties of the firm; (b) provide a 
significant competitive advantage in the near-term and 
long-term future, and (c) are developed from enterprise-
wide cross-disciplinary interactions.   
We will first examine the drivers of global 
markets, the changing organizational capabilities and 
resources, and the alternate ways strategic innovations can 
be developed by combing these two domains.  We will then 
describe technological roadmapping, and review four major 
case studies in different companies and industries.  Based 
on these roadmapping case studies, we will develop a five 
stage-process to commercialize strategic innovations.  
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Finally, we will discuss the managerial implications and 
potential future research.  
 
GLOBAL MARKET DRIVERS 
 
Competitive rivalry between global enterprises has 
intensified, with customers demanding lower costs, higher 
quality, demanding delivery times, more value-adding 
services, and radical innovations.  Mergers, takeovers, and 
collaborations have consolidated market power in the hands 
of fewer rivals, intensifying their rivalry further. 
On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, the 
symbolic monument to the Soviet communism, fell.  This 
opened new windows to unexplored markets and millions 
of potential customers in the former Second World.  China 
was inducted into the World Trade Organization in 
December 2001.  Competitors rushed to enter the emerging 
markets.  With diminishing technological barriers, the 
different parts of the “flat” world are frequently disrupted.   
 As the end of the millennium got closer, and the 
year 1999 was about to turn into 2000, the Y2K threatened 
to disrupt millions of computers around the world.  This 
forced many European and American enterprises to 
scramble for software service providers in India and 
elsewhere.   
  
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND 
RESOURCE DRIVERS 
 
The globalization of the markets forces enterprises 
to enlarge, extend, and network into virtual partnerships.  
With flattening of world markets, innovating enterprises 
were forced to globalize their operations.  China’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization implied that Chinese 
policy makers would abide by the global trading rules.  This 
reduced the risks of doing business in China.  Soon, many 
global enterprises started transplanting their production 
facilities and operations to China with lower or non-existent 
taxes, cheaper labor wages, lower health-care costs, and 
less regulations.  These global enterprises also saw the 
potential of selling a variety of consumer goods to China’s 
mammoth markets. 
Some industries such as automobile and airline 
industries have local content requirements.  These 
industries must use, integrate and collaborate with suppliers 
in different parts of the world. 
With the bubble-like growth in the IT industry in 
the 1990s, there was a shortage of skilled IT engineers.  The 
enterprises in Europe and the United States did not have 
enough skilled engineers and resources to review each line 
of the software code for every computer.  Indian IT 
companies rescued the world from the Y2K debacle.  After 
the smooth transition to the new millennium, many 
multinational enterprises were impressed by the capabilities 
of the Indian IT enterprises developing and delivering 
complex information systems (often with better quality than 
what they could develop themselves).  Collaborative 
development of software with Indian software service 
suppliers grew exponentially.  Under-sea fiber optic cable 
facilitated the globalization of software development. 
Innovating people are needed to take advantage of 
the innovative technologies and innovative business 
practices.  The opening of the new geopolitical markets 
expanded markets with over 3 billion more potential 
consumers.  This also added another roughly 1.5 billion 
new workers (Friedman, 2005).  Entry of just 10 percent of 
this working population, or 150 million workers into global 
operations would be equivalent to doubling the US 
workforce. 
With the slowdown in the American economy and 
the War on Terror, the financial resources available for 
innovation have been shrinking.  The financial stakeholders 
have shortened the payback periods.  They also demand 
higher returns from their resource allocations to research 
and development (R&D), product innovations, and process 
innovations.  The upper management echelons increasingly 
assert that the technological innovations must be linked to 






 The economic and cultural heterogeneity of global 
markets require customization of product innovations and 
process innovations.  In some parts of the world markets, 
labor costs are high and innovations using process 
automation are preferred.  In other parts of the world, lower 
labor wages motivate use of labor-intensive process 
innovations (Gehani, 1998). 
With higher intensity of rivalry, and higher 
bargaining power of increasingly demanding and 
segmented buyers, the product life cycles are shrinking.  
The increasingly complex product innovations must 
develop from mind to market in shorter periods of time.  
Yet, these must increasingly meet customized requirements.   
Complimentary innovations boost the growth of 
each innovation.  For example, innovation of paper boosted 
the innovation of pencils and writing instruments.  Opening 
of the Soviet markets, personal computers, the Internet 
browser, business process outsourcing to India, and 
manufacturing outsourcing to China complimented together 
to accelerate the need to innovate.  Friedman (2005) 
proposed that the global world markets are flattened by the 
complimentary convergence of “ten flatteners”.  
Technological roadmapping helps recognize and capture 
such convergence for commercializing innovations. 
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Introducing technological innovations is not 
enough to gain competitive advantage in global markets.  
Productivity improves significantly when these 
technological innovations are coupled with innovative 
business practices.  Wal-Mart emerged as one of the 
world’s largest enterprises by leveraging the innovations in 
information technology, and coupling these with their 
streamlined supply-chain operations. 
These different drivers must be synergized for 
successful commercialization of technological innovation.  
Overall, in global “flat” markets, enterprises must become 
more agile innovators.  Agility implies that the innovative 
enterprise can readily adapt its capabilities with market 
shifts.  It can also introduce product and process 
innovations to respond to evolutions of markets, 
regulations, enterprises, products, processes, and 
technologies. 
 
USING ROADMAPPING FOR TURBULENT 
GLOBAL MARKETS 
 
 Roadmapping is about aligning production and 
operational resources for launching a new product 
innovation, with the long-term strategic vision and market 
requirements of the firm.  It is the hierarchical integration 
where the strategic visionaries meet the day-to-day foot 
soldiers; the upper echelon executives meet the down-under 
operators.  This is when birds flying high learn to swim in 
the trenches of operations, and the fishes find out how to fly 
(Northern Ohio Live, 2000). 
 Technological roadmaps align and build bridges 
between the scenarios planning for technological 
forecasting, with the strategic vision of the firm.  The 
roadmapping involves collaborative networking among 
experts from diverse disciplines’ 
Robert Galvin (1998) of Motorola defined 
roadmap as, 
 “An extended look at the future of a chosen field 
of inquiry composed from the collective knowledge and 
imagination of the brightest drivers of change in the field.  
Roadmaps can comprise statements of theories and trends, 
the formulation of models, identification of linkages among 
and within sciences, identification of discontinuities and 
knowledge voids, and interpretations and experiments.  
Roadmaps can also include the identification of instruments 
needed to solve problems, as well as graphs, charts, and 
showstoppers.  
 Roadmaps communicate visions, attract resources 
from business and government, stimulate investigations, 
and monitor progress.  They become the inventory of 
possibilities for a particular field, thus stimulating earlier, 
more targeted investigations.  They facilitate more 
interdisciplinary networking and teamed pursuit.” 
 
KEY BENEFITS OF A TECHNOLOGY 
ROADMAP 
 
1. It links the strategic vision and intent of an 
enterprise with its product, process, and technology 
innovations.  Roadmapping can be customized at different 
levels – product, enterprise, industry, economy, or the 
world (Phaal et al., 2004). 
2. Technology roadmap helps synthesize and 
integrate the expertise and efforts of a team of experts in the 
specific field of the technology under study.   
3. It helps forecast how an emerging technology will 
be developed and commercialized, and how it will impact 
the competitive position of the subject entity over time 
(Willyard and McLees, 1987). 
4. When roadmapping is done for a product 
technology (Beck et al, 1998), it helps to identify the 
critical supporting technologies and their key drivers; the 
technology gaps that must be filled to meet the target 
product or process objectives; the different pathways to 
develop the alternate technologies, and the alternate 
technologies and information needed to make these trade-
off decisions. 
5. In some cases, roadmapping may recommend a 
single optimum pathway.  In case of a technology facing 
more uncertainty or risk, multiple paths must be pursued 
concurrently according to the roadmap. 
 
ROADMAPPING CASE STUDIES 
 
Technology Roadmapping has evolved and 
become more effective since its introduction and 
popularization by Motorola in 1987 (Willyard and McLees, 
1987).  Technology roadmapping has helped industries and 
firms of different types and sizes, innovate faster and more 
cost effectively.  They achieve a more precise strategic 
focus with a better cross-functional integration.    
 In this section we discuss four landmark case 
studies for technology roadmapping for (a) mobile 
telephony technology at Motorola, .(b) Sandia National 
Laboratories, (c) National and International Technology 
Roadmaps for Semiconductrs, and (d) nanotechnology.  
  
Case Study - A:  
TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING AT 
MOTOROLA  
 
 In 1987, Robert Galvin, CEO of Motorola, 
provided the highest level commitment to using technology 
roadmapping at Motorola (Willyard and McLees, 1987).  
Galvin (1998) declared that the primary purpose of 
technology roadmaps was to “put in motion today what is 
necessary in order to have the right technology, process 
components, and experience in place to meet the future 
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needs for products and services”  He shared that over 
several decades Motorola prolifically used sophisticated 
engineering roadmaps to gain great competitive advantage.  
(Richey and Grinnell. 2004) 
 The early roadmapping at Motorola involved 
drawing roadmaps on paper, which were taped on 
conference room walls (Willyard and McLees. 1987).  
Then, these roadmaps were generated and stored in a 
common architecture.  More recently, with digitization, 
these roadmaps were streamlined and created based on on-
line interviews with associates in different parts of 
Motorola.    
At Motorola, the Chief Technology Officer, the 
Motorola Innovation Leadership Forum, and senior 
technology leaders use Enterprise Roadmap Management 
System (ERMS) to integrate their strategic vision and 
business strategy with its technological choices. 
Gradually, Galvin’s strategic vision was infused 
into Motorola culture by using ERMS (Richey and 
Grinnell. 2004).  ERMS annually shares information 
gathered globally to represent the 7200 environment in and 
around Motorola.  ERMS includes a library of a series of 
internal roadmaps developed from many different experts 
and departments.   There is also a series of external 
roadmaps developed from information captured from 
customers, suppliers, and competitors.  These external 
roadmaps with competitive intelligence are posted weekly 
on a portal for the Motorola associates worldwide to 
review.  
These different internal roadmaps and external 
roadmaps, in the common ERMS repository, interact 
together to collaborate across different divisions and 
sections of Motorola.  This helps identify strong alignments 
and misalignments with the overall strategic intents and 
technology plans for the product and process innovations 
for mobile telecommunication technology at Motorola.   
 
Case Study-B:  
TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING AT SANDIA 
NATIONAL LABS. 
 
 Sandia National Laboratories, operated by Sandia 
Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United 
States Department of Energy (under Contract DE-AC04-
94AL85000).  Sandia played a historic role in developing 
America’s nuclear weapons stockpile, and it is responsible 
for its safety and security.  To do so, Sandia was forced to 
invest in electronics technology, and therefore Sandia felt 
the need to develop its technology roadmap.  Sandia has 
developed two other technology planning tools in addition 
to developing technology roadmapping: knowledge maps, 
and Prosperity Games (Beck et al., 1999). 
 Technology roadmapping at Sandia National 
Laboratories collaboratively identifies process and product 
targets, obstacles, and the technology alternatives available 
to reach those desired targets (Beck et al., 1999).  This 
helps track the best strategic pathway to get to the target 
future state.  
 One example of Sandia’s involvement in industry-
level technology product roadmap is the National 
Electronics Manufacturing Initiative (NEMI) Technology 
Roadmap (http://www.nemi.org website).  This roadmap 
was developed to define electronics manufacturing 
technology for semiconductor makers and designers.  
Sandia helped build roadmaps for electronic 
interconnection substrates, photonics manufacturing, board 
assembly, and precision electromechanical assembly (Beck 
et al., 1999).  The board assembly roadmap identified that 
flexible chip placement capacity per square foot, IC 
placement accuracy, and IC lead pitch are the critical 
requirements.    
The knowledge landscape for Sandia National 
Lab’s relationship to other government and corporate 
entities is graphically represented in a knowledge map.  
This uses a variety of information sets, such as patent or 
citation databases.  With the help of knowledge 
management and data mining tools, a large array of 
information is searched, synthesized, and visually 
represented.  Sandia uses VxInsight knowledge 
visualization tool developed internally (Beck et al., 1999).  
It provides a graphical interface to display large data set, 
clustering similar data together, as a 3D virtual landscape.  
This helps discover relationships between data elements 
and data sets.  Knowledge mapping allows Sandia to decide 
where to most optimally invest its future R&D resources. 
 Prosperity Games, high-level interactive 
simulations, help Sandia make multi-dimensional 
assessment of strategic, political, social, and ethical issues 
for alternate product, process, and technology innovations.  
These games help test and explore the implications of 
different optional goals and strategies for all the relevant 
stakeholders for the next 5 years or longer.  These are 
similar to seminar war games. They have a set of rules, 
multiple players, and strategic objectives.  They help test 
the implications of competition and cooperation (Beck et 
al., 1999).   
 Sandia synergizes its technology roadmapping 
with knowledge mapping and Prosperity Games and 
provides pre-game and post-game interfaces with 
technology roadmapping. 
 




Since the early 1950s, when the transistor and 
integrated circuit (IC) chip (with many transistors 
interconnected) were invented, the rapidly evolving 
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semiconductor technology has radically transformed many 
different segments of our life.  By the early 1970s, Intel had 
developed a microprocessor by embedding complex solid-
state circuits within a chip that provided high performance 
functionality.  Within a short period of time, millions of 
individual circuits could be populated within one square 
centimeter.  Miniaturization allowed embedding of 
electronic components into a huge variety of products, 
appliances, and equipments – transforming each.   
 The semiconductor products use highly complex 
circuits – to suit their different applications.  Standard 
semiconductor devices are produced in mass quantities, 
whereas customized semiconductor devices are produced in 
smaller lot sizes.  Some application specific IC (ASIC) 
devices have been migrated to mass production (Dicken, 
2007). 
 The material flows and information flows in the 
production of a semiconductor product are shown in Figure 
-1.  The overall semiconductor production is research- and 
capital intensive.  The upfront design and wafer fabrication 
stages require highly skilled scientific and engineering 
talent working in a super-clean environment.  Fabrication 
requires access to large amounts of pure water and disposal 
facilities for waste and noxious emission fumes.  The 
downstream assembly activities for semiconductors require 
low-skilled workers, preferably females with nimble 
fingers, in very different production settings than the 
upstream activities.  This part is, therefore, susceptible to 
migration from one low-cost outsourcing country to another 
lower-cost outsourcing country.  As the semiconductor 
products and intermediates have a very high value per unit 
weight, the relative cost of their transportation across long 
distances is not that significant (Dicken, 2007). 
 
Figure – 1: The production flow for a semiconductor product 
 
 
Semiconductor technology based industry, because of the 
series of technological innovations and organizational 
transformations, is in a dynamic state of flux.  With 
globalization of semiconductor production plants, the 
semiconductor industry has also seen huge geographic 
reconfiguration.  The different value-adding capabilities for 
semiconductor production have been spatially redistributed.  
Collaborative innovation has emerged as a key strategic 
driver in this industry. 
 
SEMATECH AND NATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP 
In 1987, SEMATECH was established by 14 
founding firms because recovering the world leadership in 
semiconductor technology was not possible for any 
individual US firm (Barron, 1990).  These US firms pooled 
their resources to recover from their Japanese rivals the US 
market share that was sliding from 85% to 20% in 1993 
(SEMATECH, 1992).  SEMATECH gradually emerged as 
an innovative leader and the model for industry wide 
collaboration (Harrell, 1996). 
In 1992, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, 
proposed a US-wide effort to develop a technology 
roadmap for semiconductor technology, and the need of the 
industry to look 15 years in future (Hack and DeTar, 1994).   
The National Technology Roadmap for 
Semiconductors (NTRS) dealt with eight technology areas: 
(1) Design and Test; (2) Process Integration, Device, and 
Structures (PIDS); (3) Environmental Health and Safety; 
(4) Lithography; (5) Interconnect; (6) Materials and Bulk 
Processes; (7) Packaging; and (8) Factory Integration.  By 
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1994, when NTRS was in its second edition, the revenues 
for global semiconductor products exceeded US$100 
billion, with equipment and materials accounting for US$25 
billion, and lithography reaching $5 billion (American 
Electronics Association, 1994). 
 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
ROADMAP FOR SEMICONDUCTORS 
(ITRS) 
 The nation-wide US National Technology 
Roadmap evolved in 1998 to an International Technology 
Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), with Semiconductor 
Industry Association from the US collaborating with their 
counterpart associations from Europe, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan.  ITRS included more than 800 experts, with 
representatives from other stakeholders such as 
semiconductors manufacturing and testing equipments 
manufacturers, materials suppliers, research institutions and 
their international consortia, and more.   
An International Roadmap Committee (IRC) 
coordinates eight International Technical Working Groups 
(ITWG), each focusing on one key component of 
semiconductor technology, with four crosscut ITWGs (See 
Figure -2).  The eight ITWGs focus on: (1) design; (2) test; 
(3) front-end processes; (4) interconnect; (5) lithography; 
(6) process integration; (7) assembly and packaging; and 
(8) factory integration.  The four crosscut ITWGs work on 
(1) modeling and simulation; (2) metrology; (3) yield 
enhancement; and (4) environment safety & health issues.  
 
Figure – 2: 12 International Technical Working Groups (ITWGs) for 
International Semiconductor Technology Roadmap (ISTR) 
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The overall ITRS mission was to define the near-
term and long-term technology requirements for the global 
semiconductor industry, and describe the potential technical 
solutions to meet these needs.  The ITRS was chartered to 
be edited every odd number year, with updates of the tables 
to be issued in the even numbered years. 
 In the ITRS definition phase, a hierarchy of 
requirements was established for the integrated circuits (see 
Table-1).  First the power, cost, speed, and density 
requirements for ICs are established (Arden, 2002).  Then 
the overall device requirements, such as transistor size, 
threshold voltage requirement, leakage and drive currents 
and supply voltage are established.  This is followed by the 
device scaling and design requirements, including gate 
length and dielectric, junction depth, and channel 
engineering properties.  Finally, the process integration 
requirements are developed, specifying overall process 
flow, thermal budget, and material properties.  
 
 





Based on intense interactions and collaborations 
between the different Technical Working Groups, the 
overall technology characteristics are established and 
projected for the next 15 years.  As an illustration see 
Table-2 from the ITRS 2001.  This Table defines the half-
pitch values for Dynamic Random Access Memories 
(DRAMs) and Micro Processing Units (MPUs), and gate 
lengths for MPUs and ASICs.  The DRAM features 
followed a 3-year cycle, using a scaling factor of 0.3 every 
three years.  Until 2004, the feature size scaling for MPUs 
followed a 2-year cycle, and then it returned to a 3-year 
cycle.  For MPU gate lengths, 2-year cycles were used until 
2005, and then a 3-year cycle.  ASIC geometries lag MPUs 
by two years, to facilitate better control of system power 
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Subsequent editions of ITRS noted the need for 
new technology generations, with exponentially increasing 
requirement for packing density and device speed at 
significantly decreasing cost per function (Arden, 2006).  
The packing density has been doubling every three years, 
and microprocessor performance has been doubling every 
2-3 years.  Cost per function has been decreasing by 29% 
per year.  In the former years, 30% scaling factor in 3 year 
cycle was used, speeding to 2-year cycle after 1998.  For 
future projections, ITRS was considering the implications 
of using both the 2-year cycle and the 3-year cycle.  
Whereas DRAMs are driving for the minimum feature 
sizes, the microprocessors are requiring higher device 
performance and very short gate lengths (Arden, 2006).  
 
Case study – D:  
NANOTECHNOLOGY ROADMAP 
 
 The recent innovations in nanomaterial technology 
are radically transforming a number of different industries, 
just like the way semiconductor technology transformed 
many industries in the 1970s and 1980s (Hood, 2004).  
Nanomaterials have at least one dimension of nano or 10-9 
meters (or about 10 atom long).  These materials behave 
according to the Einsteinonian quantum mechanics rather 
than according to the Newtonian mechanics.  Compared to 
conventional materials, nanomaterials have a large 
proportion of surface atoms and high surface area where 
reactive activity takes place.  This gives the nano products, 
depending on the specific nano particles involved, 
extraordinary characteristics, such as mechanical strength, 
optical sensitivity, magnetism, reactivity, conductivity, and 
much more properties commonly not seen in the Newtonian 
materials. 
The National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), is 
a US consortium of 19 federal agencies including the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute 
for Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
others.  It overseas and funds close to US$1 billion on 
widespread efforts to develop nanotechnology in the US.  
NNI estimates that Nanotechnology based industry in 2015 
(or sooner) would be worth more than US$1 trillion, and a 
significant part of the world economy (Chemical Industry 
Vision 2020; Hood, 2004).  This consortium meets monthly 
to exchange knowledge, identify goals and research gaps, 
and coordinate efforts. 
The NIH Roadmap for Medical Research, that 
guides speedy development and commercialization of new 
technologies and knowledge for diagnostics, treatment, and 
prevention of diseases, contains a significant nanomedicine 
initiative.  This started in September 2005 with the 
development of a few multidisciplinary Nanomedicine 
Development Centers to develop and commercialize 
Nanotechnologies in less than 10 years.  NIN projected that 
by 2015 about 50% of all drug discovery and delivery 
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technology would be based on Nanotechnology (Hood, 
2004). 
In June 2004, NNI coordinated leaders of 
Nanotechnology in 25 countries into The International 
Dialog on Responsible Research and Development of 
Nanotechnology.  Their objective was to develop a global 
vision of developing and commercializing nanotechnology 
appropriately.  This group proposed the establishment of a 
preparatory ongoing international organization dedicated to 
global coordination, responsible research and development, 
and commercialization of nanotechnology (Hood, 2004).     
 




 In this section, we illustrate the benefits of using 
roadmapping for commercializing technology innovations. 
 Consider Niagara Nanopolymer (a composite of 
real companies) investing $120 million and seven years for 
developing an innovative silicon-based Nanotoughner 
additive product to reinforce synthetic elastomers.  This 
product innovation has potential for multiple market 
applications in tires and engineering belts.  This new 
product was likely to revolutionize the industry by 
replacing carbon black as a reinforcement in tires.   
The strategic leaders at Niagara Nanopolymer 
were intensely aware of their rapidly emerging rivals in 
China and Japan, ready to imitate or pirate its technological 
advantage by reverse-engineering Nanotoughner.  These 
strategic leaders, therefore, focused their enormous time, 
efforts, and financial resources to build a strong intellectual 
property fence by patenting the product and trade-marking 
its brands. The product launch was highly successful and a 
large number of potential tire manufacturers rapidly 
accepted the new product, demanding for large quantities of 
deliveries.  
 In their rush to develop Nanotoughner, and to 
protect its intellectual property, the strategic leaders at 
Niagara Nanopolymer did not find it necessary to roadmap 
their nanotechnology.  They failed to allocate adequate 
resources to develop the production process innovations 
with higher yield.  To rush to market, the Nanotoughner 
product innovation was developed at the expense of 
developing appropriate process innovations with higher 
productivity yields.  As the purchase orders started pouring 
in, Niagara Nanopolymer was forced to invest large capital 
investments on its inefficient production process with low 
yield.  Their cash flow suffered, and Niagara Nanopolymer 
was heading rapidly towards bankruptcy. 
 Niagara Nanopolymer had a long-time Japanese 
rival in Nippon Nanopolymer.  While Niagara 
Nanopolymer was developing its Nanotoughner, Nippon 
Nanopolymer was known to be developing a competing 
Nanoflex product innovation.  The strategic leaders at 
Nippon Nanopolymer believed in using technology 
roadmapping process.  They closely coordinated their 
product innovations, production process innovations, 
quality promise innovations, and other related value-adding 
capabilities (Gehani, 1998).  While developing its 
innovative product Nanoflex, the strategic leaders at 
Nippon Nanopolymer allocated adequate capital resources 
to innovate and improve yield of the production process for 
Nanoflex.  At the same time, the strategic leaders at Nippon 
Nanopolymer also started collaborating with their suppliers 
so that they were able to supply the most economical raw 
materials, and were able to scale up rapidly to the high 
volumes their customers needed.        
 As the global market demand grew for 
Nanotoughner and Nanoflex, Niagara Nanopolymer was 
unable to ramp-up but Nippon Nanopolymer was able to 
scale up its production process rapidly, and penetrate the 
global markets with fast diffusion of Nanoflex. 
  This case study clearly indicates the strategic 
significance that technology roadmapping can make for 
commercializing product, process, and technology 
innovations.  In the next section, we briefly discuss the 
five-stage technology roadmapping process. 
 
TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING PROCESS 
 
 In this section we review how an innovative 
enterprise can effectively align and integrate its strategic 
vision and intent with its organizational capabilities and 
resources, and commercialize its strategic innovations to 




 Technology-intensive enterprises can innovate by 
networking their value-adding capabilities clustered in three 
layers: primary transformational, supporting secondary, and 
tertiary value integrating capabilities (Gehani, 1998).  The 
primary value-adding capabilities deal with the primary 
business of the enterprise, transforming its lower value raw 
materials into higher value finished goods.  The supporting 
value-adding capabilities appropriately allocate the people 
and their skills, knowledge and information, and financial 
resources raised internally or acquired from outside.  And, 
finally, the tertiary value-adding capabilities involve 
integrating primary and secondary value-adding capabilities 
listed earlier, and develop the strategic intent or vision of 
the firm.  This alignment can be often done in a variety of 
ways discussed next. 
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Figure – 3:  Value-Adding Net (VAN) of Competencies for Strategic Innovation 
 
 
According to the top-down planning paradigm, the process 
begins with an organization’s vision and strategic intent – 
usually conceived by the strategic leaders in the upper 
echelons (Gehani, 1994. QP).  The strategic alternatives are 
then implemented through operational capabilities to 
achieve above market-average returns.  One might expect 
that such an organized and controlled top-down approach to 
innovating would consistently produce a series of superior 
innovations.  Empirical research studies in strategic 
management (Bresser and Bishop, 1983), however, do not 
provide conclusive evidence that strategic planning 
consistently produces superior corporate performance.  The 
top-down strategic planners are often obsessed primarily 
with financial resources and profit performance.  This is 
generally done at the expense of neglecting other key 
resources, such as the human capital and their creativity.  
 In a fast-shifting “Flat” world market, the 
assumptions needed for top-down strategic planning are 
frequently disrupted.  Bhide (1986) proposed that 
successful innovative enterprises do not pursue strategic 
planning, but develop hustle as a strategy, characterized by 
action-oriented fast decisions with a focus on operating 
details.  Hayes (1985) suggested that for fast-shifting 
dynamic markets, the enterprises must first carefully assess 
the available resources and capabilities to determine the 
domain of feasible actions and the bottom-up strategies that 
they can afford.   
 For the fast-shifting “flat” global markets, the best 
features of the two alternate approaches, visionary top-
down planned innovation and the bottom-up resource based 
strategic innovations, can be fused together to 
commercialize the strategic innovations in the most 
effective and efficient way (Gehani, 1994, QP).  This 
process shown in Figure –2, can be done in five stages. 
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Figure - 4    Integrating Strategic Intent and Operations 





Stage - 1. Conceive a strategic intent or vision for 
future technological innovations. 
 
 Monitor the drivers of the market environment, 
such as flattening of the world and globalization of former 
closed markets.  Consider the fragmenting customer 
preferences and shortening of product life cycles (including 
other drivers discussed in the earlier section).  Before 
choosing strategic intent or vision, audit the internal 
capabilities and resources to identify the emerging 
technological innovations that might drive global 
competition in the near-term and the long-term.  Consider 
how product innovations are becoming increasingly 
complex, and the product life cycles are shrinking. 
 
 
Stage - 2. Capture the available technologies and 
capabilities in-house and choose those needed 
technologies not available in-house that you have 
resources to acquire. 
 
 Many technological capabilities may be scattered 
in the “attics” and the “basements” of the innovative 
enterprise.   A careful audit of the available portfolio of 
product, process, and technological innovations may 
identify some strategic gaps that must be filled.  Beware of 
the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) syndrome and the pitfalls of 
underestimating the potential utility of product, process, 
and technology innovations developed elsewhere.  
Collaborate with carefully selected partners to share the risk 
of developing technologies for complex products.   
 
Stage - 3. Choose from the alternate strategic 
innovations. 
 
 Before selecting the strategic innovations that an 
enterprise proposes to pursue in the future, it must carefully 
assemble the key criteria for choosing the desirability and 
feasibility of the selected strategic innovations.  Many US 
enterprises are impatient in seeking out as high profitability 
from their “star” and “question-mark” product and process 
innovations as they have been extracting from their “cash-
cow” businesses (Gehani, 1998).  Japanese rivals, on the 
other hand, value market penetration and market share more 
than profit margins.  Whereas incremental improvements 
reduce the risks, these also offer lower barriers to new 
entrants, and thereby lower the potential profit margins. 
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Stage - 4. Commercialize the selected strategic 
innovations. 
 
 Strategic innovations are embedded into new 
products that customers value, high yielding productive 
processes, and/or innovative platforms of technologies that 
disrupt or create new segments of sustainable opportunities.  
Commercialization must take into account the diffusion 
time it takes from getting early adopters to a rampant 
growth (Gehani, 1998).  Rate of potential returns invariably 
correlates with the extent of risk a firm is willing to take in 







5. Contest the intellectual property in your 
strategic innovations. 
 
 The process of strategic innovation does not end 
with commercializing new products and/or platforms of 
innovative process technologies.  If the intellectual property 
thus created and embedded in products and processes is left 
inappropriately protected, it is likely to be appropriated by 
rivals or pirates. 
Innovative companies integrate their strategic 
business plans with their technology roadmaps.  The 
technology roadmap identifies how the relevant product, 
process, and technological innovations would meet over 
time the business objectives according to its strategic 
vision/intent (see Table –3 for the composition of a 
comprehensive technology roadmap).  This is a living 
document that must be re-clarified, altered, and updated 
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Stage-1 of the technology roadmapping process 
helps develop the uppermost layer of the Technology 
Roadmap.  A careful assessment of the different national 
environments would help identify the most appropriate 
macro-economic national environment for your 
technological innovations.  This may have been the USA in 
the past, but it may switch to France or Japan in the near-
term future, and China in the long-term future.  In a similar 
manner, the micro-industry environment may switch from 
adverse now to favorable in the distant future.  The market 
drivers in this industry may have been slow in the past, but 
with complimentary innovations, these may have gradually 
galloped to a jet-age pace of change.  Similar changes are 
recorded for competition and business strategies (See 
Table-3).  
Stage-2 of the process provides information for the 
bottom-layer of operational capabilities and resources.  
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Note down how the quality expectations are shifting, and 
how the knowledge platform will grow over time.   
Stage-3 and stage-4 help develop the middle layer 
in your technology roadmap.  This layer takes into account 
that the product innovations are expected to become more 
complex, while their life cycles would steadily shrink.  The 
production process innovations may become exceedingly 
expensive over the years, as in the case of semiconductor 
fabrication plants.  Finally, stage-5 helps maintain the 
competitiveness of the firm by protecting and contesting the 
intellectual property created with product, process, and 
technology innovations. 
       
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
 Technology Roadmapping has found many 
supporters, considering the widespread and multi-year 
participation of more than 800 experts in the International 
Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) since its 
start in 1998.  The strategic leaders at Motorola continue to 
be committed to their use of Technology Roadmapping for 
mobile telecommunication technology.  National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) is helping a large number 
of policy makers and innovative entrepreneurs to make 
sense from this emerging technology.   
 Planning technology may be straight-forward in 
those technologies where an enterprise has a long history of 
well-established capabilities and knowledge expertise.  
Such an enterprise is well-prepared for their customers’ 
current and potential future needs.  Their competitors’ 
current and potential future threats are clear and well 
understood.  On the other hand, in the case of fast-changing 
and frequently disrupting technologies it is much harder to 
assess the current status of an enterprise, relative to its 
rivals, with respect to the strategic technologies.  It is also 
harder to pinpoint where it needs to be in future and how it 
will get there, and by when. 
 Whereas, successive iterations of ITRS have 
upgraded and revised their assumptions from one edition to 
the next, some semiconductor experts have questioned the 
basis for such assumptions (Braun, 2003).  Some 
companies accelerated the speed at which they introduced 
new technology nodes, from a 3-year cycle to a 2-year 
cycle in the late 1990s.  The 2005 ITRS removed the 
assumption of technology node as the main pace setter for 
the IC industry (Singer, 2006).  Braun (2003) proposed that 
it was time to develop a more comprehensive systems 
roadmap.     
 Dr. George M. C. Fisher (1991), President and 
CEO of Motorola in the late 1980s, suggested that the 
United States must develop a roadmap to technological 
leadership.  Fisher urged that,  
“…this roadmap should include a 
national intent to be the world’s leader in 
developing and commercializing technologies that 
improve our standard of living, quality of life, 
international competitiveness, and national 
security.  It should also include national strategy 
to ensure that resources are available and 
committed to this effort.”  
 Finally, the case studies of four different 
technology roadmaps discussed here, indicate that usually 
the upper strategic part of a technology roadmaps is paid 
much less attention than its lower operational capabilities 
part.  More research is recommended to better integrate the 
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